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Indigenous insurance associations are a prevalent form of membership based 
organisations of the poor, at least in the rural areas in Ethiopia and Tanzania surveyed 
by the authors. Results show how villagers with few links to any formal kind of insurance 
market have established membership-based indigenous insurance associations to protect 
themselves against unexpected expenditures, mainly for funerals and hospitalisation. 
Many of these institutions tend to co-exist within the same community and are based on 
well-defined rules and regulations, well beyond informal reciprocal relations. They tend 
to offer premium-based insurance for funeral expenses, as well as, in many cases, other 
forms of insurance and credit to help address hardship. These groups are completely 
owned and managed by their members. They were locally initiated and have been 
continually developing through the actions of their own members, without involvement 
from the government or donors. Using detailed group membership data linked to 
household survey data we show that (i) these institutions are widely prevalent in the 
surveyed areas, (ii) households typically belong to several groups at the same time, (iii) 
they display a large degree of inclusiveness and (iv) they insure an important part of 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses a particular form of membership based organisation of the poor: a 
membership based indigenous insurance association. They are associations of people who 
have an explicit agreement to help each other in a specified way when well-defined 
events occur. These institutions are discussed in two rural contexts: Ethiopia and 
Tanzania. In both countries they have gradually evolved into well-structured groups 
offering insurance to help cover mainly funeral and hospitalisation expenses. This paper 
discusses their history, the way they currently operate, their coverage and their impact. 
As many of these associations focus on funeral insurance, we discuss briefly some 
evidence on how they have been affected by the HIV/AIDS crisis. 
 
The literature on risk in development economics has analysed both the extent of risk 
experienced and the responses to risk in developing countries (for reviews, see Morduch, 
1995; Townsend, 1995; and Dercon, 2002). One key response is that households try to 
reduce the consequences of the risk in their income by a  variety of risk-coping 
mechanisms, including engaging in forms of risk-sharing via informal arrangements. The 
key empirical papers (such as Townsend, 1994; Grimard, 1997; Ligon et al., 2002) as 
well as theoretical papers (including Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Genicot and Ray, 2003) 
all focus on “informal” risk-sharing arrangements, which should be understood not only 
in the sense that they were taking place outside the market place but also that they were 
“informal” in that they were not based on well-defined “formal” associations, with 
formally defined, written sets of rules or regulations governing their operation. These 
institutions are sustained over time on the basis of implicit rules enforced by social 
norms, so that, once joined, no-one is tempted to defect later when they realise that their 
own contribution is outweighing their personal and social benefits. However, much 
recent theoretical literature has shown that norms, or other rules-based enforcement 
mechanisms, are not necessary for these arrangements to be sustained. In other words, 
incentive systems within the arrangements can be designed to make the contracts ex-post 
self-enforcing. 
 
There is some work that considers linkages between individuals and households that 
identify specific people as their insurance partners (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Ayalew, 
2003; Dercon and De Weerdt, 2002). Even so, these contributions do not focus on groups 
or associations — but largely on bilateral arrangements with a risk-pooling purpose. This 
paper goes beyond this analysis by discussing insurance groups; indigenous associations 
common in developing countries with a specific focus on insurance and with well-defined 
rules and obligations, in the form of membership rules, specific contributions and fines 
related to deviant behaviour. In particular, it discusses membership based indigenous 
insurance associations in Ethiopia and Tanzania, based on a unique data set on the 
functioning of these groups, with matching household level data on the members.  
 
There is a considerable amount of literature on groups and associations in developing 
countries and their economic impact. However, most of its focus is on their role as  
“social capital”.1 The purpose or functioning of these groups is less relevant in this 
literature. Other literature focuses on development initiatives using community-based 
organisations. One strand is related to health insurance, since many initiatives have 
developed around voluntary but community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes 
(Jutting, 2003; Atim, 1998). Although some of the issues involved are comparable to 
those related to indigenous insurance groups, a key difference is that CBHI schemes tend 
to develop with clear linkages to NGOs or specific health facilities.  
 
Discussion on membership based indigenous insurance associations in existing literature 
is very limited at present. In the Ethiopian context, Aredo (1993, 1998) has discussed 
funeral associations in some detail from an economic point of view. This study is 
different in that it is directly based on survey data on the functioning and membership of 
these institutions in a rural setting. There is a limited amount of sociological and 
anthropological literature on these institutions as well (for example, Pankhurst, 2003). In 
the Tanzanian context, there appears to be no analysis of these institutions. More 
generally, Rutherford (2001) has documented the existence of insurance mechanisms for 
funerals across the developing world. Still, no systematic economic analysis of these 
institutions can be found in the literature. Although the present analysis is largely 
economic, it is also informed by anthropological work focusing on the historical context 
and evolution of the particular format of the institutions. 
 
Many of the groups we discuss are focused on funeral insurance and there are good 
reasons for this. Firstly, funeral expenditure in much of the developing world is usually 
large and tends to represent a large proportion of households’ monthly income. Roth 
(1999) suggests that the poor in South  Africa will spend approximately 15 times their 
average monthly income on funerals. Our own surveys also suggest substantial figures 
for Ethiopia and Tanzania. Rutherford (2001) finds that funeral insurance is one of the 
most sought-after products offered b y more formalised microfinance institutions. 
Secondly, it is also a highly insurable event in these settings. Moral hazard is unlikely to 
be relevant for insuring a funeral whereas, given relatively high mortality, it is a common 
event in families, but still typically with relatively low covariance.  
 
The next section will present the basic characteristics of these groups based on unique 
survey data in both countries. The insurance cover provided and the basic functioning and 
history of these groups will be discussed. Section 3 goes on to discuss how different 
groups in the same location relate to each other and how a localised insurance market 
emerge. Section 4 discusses issues related to inclusion, exclusion and impact. Section 5  
puts the emergence of these groups in an historical context, while Section 6 looks at the 




                                                  
1 Using Putnam et al. (1993), social capital can be defined as referring to features of social organisation, 
such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society. In particular, the focus is on 
the external effects of community relations on outcomes of interpersonal interactions: “strong” social 
capital tends then to be associated with economic success.  
2. Basic Characteristics 
 
A membership based indigenous insurance scheme is a locally initiated association of 
people, who have voluntarily entered into an explicit agreement to help each other when 
well defined events occur. We call these organisations indigenous because they have 
grown from within the community, without any direct outside involvement. We call them 
membership based, because the group is completely owned and managed by its 
beneficiaries. They are voluntary because no one is under strict pressure to become a 
member of a particular group, definitely not compared to the stricter kinship-based 
systems.2 
 
We have data from two rural contexts, in Ethiopia and Tanzania, where such institutions 
are prevalent and important in people’s livelihoods. First, there are data from a 
number of communities in rural Ethiopia, studied as part of the Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey. This survey has been collecting panel data on households and 
communities since 1989, focusing on 15 communities from across the country.3 In this 
study, data are available on funeral societies in those villages. In total, detailed data has 
been collected on 78 funeral societies in seven villages4 — about half the number of 
funeral societies present in these villages. In one village, the data were matched to the 
households in the household survey, allowing some more detailed analysis. The village in 
question consists of the communities in Sirbana Godeti, a relatively prosperous village in 
Oromiya Region in central Ethiopia, where about 30 funeral groups were identified, 
about half of which were studied. Additional data from communities in Southern Ethiopia 
complement this analysis, although for the time being these data are not fully analysed.5 
It should be stressed that some of the detail of the way the organisations function is 
different across rural and urban Ethiopia, but most of the fundamental characteristics are 
common across large parts of the country. In Ethiopia, the funeral associations are known 
as the iddir (e’dir) — associations that ensure a payout in cash and in kind at the time of a 
funeral for a deceased member of the family of a member of the group.6 
 
The second context is a village in Kagera Region in Western Tanzania, called Nyakatoke, 
relatively close to the Ugandan border, near Lake Victoria. A detailed census of all 
community organisations and informal n etworks, with an emphasis on insurance-based 
linkages, was conducted  — details are in De Weerdt (2004). Over 40 groups were 
identified and 20 of these groups were classified as having a prime insurance function 
and were included in the analysis. The “traditional” funeral society, the Bujuni covers the 
basic funeral insurance, but several groups surround this to give additional insurance. 
                                                  
2 In Tanzania, there is some social pressure to be part of at least one women’s group. Women not part of a 
group are considered anti-social and uncooperative. Still, they are free to choose which group to join, or 
even to set up new groups. 
3 Details of the overall survey are in Dercon and Krishnan (2003). 
4 “Village” is used to mean a Peasant Association. Rural Ethiopia is administratively divided into Peasant 
Associations, which are a collection of communities. 
5 The data on Sirbana Godeti were collected in 2002, but the data on the other villages were only collected 
from October to December 2003, and are not yet matched to the household data. 
6 ‘Iddir’ is the generic name. In some areas, other local names are used – such as ‘kire’ in parts of Wollo. 
They are all referred to as iddir in this paper.  
They include seven Women’s Associations, themselves united in the Muungano (the 
Union of Women’s Groups), four neighbourhood and five religion-based groups. 
 
In strong contrast to informal networks of neighbours and friends, these associations have 
clearly defined membership lists. By no means do these groups consist of a loose, rapidly 
changing association of people. Membership is confined to founding members and those 
applying to become members afterwards. In both contexts, there is a membership fee to 
be paid when joining after formation. A number of instances were found where groups 
have particular restrictions, such as by gender or age. Payments are made when members 
incur costs related to funerals or hospitalisations (sometimes also other events, see 
below). The payout is conditional on the relationship of the member to the deceased: for 
example, the payment for the spouse of a member can be different from the payout for a 
child or for uncles and aunts. Table 1 identifies the defining elements of a membership 
based indigenous insurance association. 
 
Table 1: Defining Elements of Membership Based Indigenous Insurance 
Associations 
Membership Based  Owned and managed by its beneficiaries. There are founding members and there 
is membership by application. Typically there is a membership fee. Sometimes 
there are restrictions to membership (e.g. only certain religions, member has to be 
above a certain age or has to be a woman) 
Indigenous  Grown from within the community, without outside intervention. Different, for 
example, from a credit group that has formed with the specific purpose of 
accessing an NGO’s credit scheme. 
Insurance  For well-defined events, there is a payout in cash, in-kind and/or in labour. Often 
it will also include the use of capital goods (e.g. sheets to make tents for guests) 
Association  They are formed explicitly and no one is automatically a member (as is e.g. the 
case in kinship networks). Clearly defined membership lists. 
 
Although payouts systems differ widely between the two study areas and per insured 
event, a unifying element is that they occur both in cash, kind and labour. In-kind payouts 
can be, for example, food, grass for the funeral guests to sit on, or the use of capital goods 
that the group owns, like big cooking pots or sheets to make covers against the sun. 
Contributions in labour are given at the funeral or hospital, but also to catch up with lost 
days of labour on the farm. 
 
The payout systems are quite refined and in both contexts, there are written statutes, 
bylaws and records of contributions and payouts. There will also be rules defining 
membership procedures, payout schedules, contributions and also a set of fines and other 
measures for non-payment of contributions, or for matters such as failure to attend 
funerals or not contributing enough in terms of labour on these occasions.  
 
Finally, one of the most remarkable findings of the work in these communities was the 
very large number of membership based indigenous insurance associations in these 
communities. In Sirbana Godeti in Ethiopia, a community about 400 households, about 
30 iddirs were found. In some other villages in Ethiopia, a s omewhat more modest 
number seems to be present but still five or more; but in a number of villages the number 
of iddirs was well above 50 and more — in Imdibir, one of the study villages, the study  
was able to identify about 80 to 100 groups, albeit not all just covering the village, but 
with substantial membership in the village, despite having only a population of about 350 
households. In Tanzania, the village studied (Nyakatoke), had a population of 120 
households only, but 20 insurance groups were identified. It is obvious from this that 
people can and usually are members of more than one association — see below for more 
on this. 
 
What type of the insurance provided by these groups? All groups in Ethiopia propose 
funeral insurance. In Tanzania, all but one group provided funeral insurance (the 
exception being a small group of 18, with only two members from the specific village) 
and 13 groups provide hospitalisation insurance. Table 2 gives the benefits paid out by 
groups for funerals (in the scenario wherein the member dies; this is usually the 
maximum payout) and hospitalisation insurance when the member is admitted to hospital 
and spends at least one day there (only for Tanzania). At the relevant exchange rates, the 
payout for funerals in both countries  is approximately  €20 on average per group. Note 
that the figure for Tanzania includes in-kind benefits (in terms of food) of approximately 
of 80 per cent of this figure. For Ethiopia, these figures do not include the in-kind 
benefits, although they exist but are generally more limited: in about a quarter of cases, 
some in-kind benefits were reported in Ethiopia, but relatively modest in value (usually 
coffee and injera, the basic staple food made from teff)7. In Tanzania, all groups reported 
in-kind contributions which, in all but one case, were more substantial than the cash 
contributions. These calculations do not include some labour services provided in a 
minority of cases in both countries. In Tanzania, the seven women’s groups ask members 
to help at the funeral typically for one day, but this is not done by any of the other groups. 
In Ethiopia, about half the groups contribute labour (beyond the funeral) as well — 
typically one to three days of labour per member, including farm and related work. 
Especially in Ethiopia, this contribution is particularly substantial.  
 
Table 2: Payouts for Funerals (in case member dies) and Hospitalisation 
  Mean  Standard deviation  Median 
Tanzania (in TSh)       
Funeral  16,655  16,477  13,000 
Hospitalisation  3,856  3,461  3,000 
Ethiopia (in Birr)       
Funeral  206  177  150 
Source: Own data. Tanzania includes on average TSh 13,598 of in-kind benefits for funerals and TSh 744 
for hospitalisation. Ethiopia does not include in-kind benefits. Exchange rates at the time of the 
surveys: €1 = 10 birr and 800 Tanzanian Shilling. 
 
In Tanzania, 13 out of the 20 organisations also offer hospitalisation insurance: a fixed 
payout usually in cash but sometimes some labour whenever the member or close family 
is admitted to hospital and a relative has to stay with the person. The average payout is 
about €5 per instance, well below the payouts in the case of a funeral, but still significant. 
 
                                                  
7 This may be different in other areas of Ethiopia, not surveyed. Mariam (2003) reports on iddirs in 
Southwestern Ethiopia only providing in kind benefits to their members in terms of food, materials and 
labour in the case of a funeral.  
Table 3 summarises a number of crucial differences between the two contexts. For 
example, in Tanzania, the main groups expected members to provide their cash and in-
kind distribution at the moment the death is announced. In Ethiopia about 80 percent of 
the groups were charging a regular contribution, usually monthly, from the members.8 In 
the village studied in more detail, all but one iddir operated on this principle. In more 
urbanised contexts, this percentage is close to 100 per cent. There, virtually all groups 
discussed actually pay a monthly or similarly regular contribution (Pankhurst, 2003). 
 
Table 3: Premiums, Asset holdings, Entry Fees and Group Size in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania 
Source: data collected by the authors. 
 
A key consequence of this phenomenon is that some of these groups retain very 
substantial savings. In fact, in the full sample (i.e. including those not charging a fixed 
regular contribution), asset holdings were on average about 1900 birr ( €190), a 
substantial sum in a country with a yearly GDP per capita of only about €100. Many 
iddirs were found to have much more in terms of accumulated savings; the highest sum 
reported was about €3000. Obviously, regular membership contributions and group sizes 
play a role here as well. Average contributions per month per member of the 63 Ethiopian 
groups charging a regular contribution (either weekly, fortnightly or monthly) were 1.64 
birr per month (the median is 1, the range was 0.25 to 5 birr, the standard deviation is 
1.44). Contributions are fixed per member, irrespective of age or family size. Groups in 
Ethiopia were also charging substantial entrance fees for anyone currently wanting to 
join: about 42 birr, or 25 times the monthly contribution. Interestingly, about 40 per cent 
of groups reported setting these entrance fees as a fixed contribution, the rest suggested a 
formula based on the current assets and property per member. Furthermore, groups in 
Ethiopia were larger, on average about 84 members, with a median of 55, compared to an 
average size of 24 (median 18) in Tanzania.9 Although a few very small iddirs were 
found in Ethiopia, in each of the seven villages the average size is larger than in 
Tanzania. 
 
                                                  
8 Most of these groups would also ask for a fixed additional contribution at the time of a funeral. 
9 Mariam (2003) reports even a mean group size of 175 in his sample of 52 iddirs. 
Ethiopia  Tanzania 
Usually, regular contributions in cash (average about 
€0.16) 
Contribution only when the funeral takes place 
Cumulative Asset Holding, largely in cash 
(mean=€190). 
Limited assets (durables) 
Usually relatively substantial entrance fee (mean=€4 
per family).  
Relatively limited entrance fee (mean for women’s 
groups=€1) 
Mean group size is 84 (median=55)  Mean group size is 24 (median=18)  
3. The Emergence of an Insurance Market 
 
This section discusses the inter-linkages between groups in the same community and 
aims to show how a localised insurance market emerges. Some of the surveyed 
Tanzanian groups make membership conditional on membership of other groups in the 
village. For example, the women’s groups are clearly providing supplementary insurance 
over and above the village level burial society, the Bujuni (which is the Haya word for 
“mutual help”). The women’s groups explicitly state this in their statutes: only women 
from Nyakatoke whose husband is a member of the village burial society may belong. 
The insurance they offer is meant to cover expenses not covered by the burial society. 
The neighbourhood and religion-based groups are similarly providing supplementary 
cover.  
 
The Ethiopian groups typically do not have terms of conditional membership and 
households are usually free to join as many, or as few iddirs as they want. Most villages 
have a number of iddirs, largely differentiated in terms of the amount of cash offered in 
the event of a funeral and, related to this, the regular contribution paid. Although the 
groups spoken to in Ethiopia clearly emphasise funeral insurance, a substantial number 
offer other benefits to their members. First, about 64 per cent of groups offer loans to 
members, provided the funds are available, with clear (and strictly enforced) rules 
governing repayment. Members have to present a case for obtaining a short-term loan, 
and the most commonly accepted reasons are additional funeral spending, illness and 
destruction of a house  — to put it differently, short-term credit is offered to provide 
additional cover, mainly for shocks. Secondly, 64 per cent (but not necessarily the same 
groups as those offering loans), offer other forms of insurance, but the cover offered is 
clearly dependent on the group. Table 4 summarises the types of insurance they offer and 
it is clear that each group that provides additional cover offers only a limited set of other 
benefits, such as fire and house destruction insurance. About 30 per cent of the groups 
offering additional cover provide payouts in case of serious illness in one way or another. 
Note that in all cases no additional separate premium is charged, but all is included in the 
basic premium10. 
 
Table 4 Types of Additional Insurance Offered in Ethiopian Iddirs (as a percentage 
of those groups offering additional cover) 
Destruction of House  40% 
Illness  30% 
Fire  28% 
Death of Cattle  24% 
Harvest  14% 
Wedding  14% 
Source: data collected by the authors. 
 
                                                  
10 In a study by Mariam (2003) of 52 iddirs in mainly rural Ethiopia, similar results were found. The study 
reports that, besides funeral expenses, insurance and/or credit was also given for house fire (44 per cent) 
and illness episodes (20 per cent).  
The surveyed groups in Tanzania, in contrast, offer a wider variety of insurance products. 
For example, Bertha’s group has 11 members and offers TSh 100, 30 fingers of bananas 
and 3 bowls of beans when there is a funeral, while Eles’ group has 17 members and 
offers 3kg of meat, 2 hands of bananas and 5 bowls of beans.11 
 
But groups will differ in more than just the premiums and payouts they maintain. In the 
Tanzanian context a woman typically moves to the village of the husband upon marriage. 
If a funeral occurs in her home village then it is typically expensive for her to attend this 
as there are transport costs, contributions, presents, clothes, etc. to be bought. Some 
groups in Nyakatoke extended their coverage to also include funerals on the woman’s 
side of the family. Subscribing to such a scheme will increase a woman’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis her husband when deciding whether or not to attend a funeral in her 
home village. 
 
These groups are completely owned by their members and one manifestation of this is 
how innovations occur. For example, in Tanzania, the main groups expected members to 
provide their cash and in-kind distribution at the moment the death was announced takes 
place. It usually only takes one day for the group to get organised. That means that the 
first day there will be no contributions, but still visitors will start pouring in they need to 
be catered for. Therefore some people have organised themselves in mwatani wabaki 
groups that hold stocks of beans (collected after the bean harvest), own some cups and 
saucers and have a commitment to be ready to help from the first hours. 
 
Clearly, there is an element of choice of product in these communities and people can 
express their preferences for different insurance packages. Furthermore, as they are in a 
very real sense the ‘owners’ and the ‘beneficiaries’ of these insurance schemes they are 
guaranteed to be engineered in a way that benefits the members most. 
 
A last example of an innovative insurance market structure comes again from Tanzania. 
As noted before, there are 7 women’s groups in this community. After a period of 
working independently they decided to join in a super-structure called the Muungano or 
the Union of Women’s Groups. The  Muungano provides a minimum package of 
insurance when a member is hit by a  funeral or a hospitalisation. Outside of this 
insurance package through the  Muungano, each women’s group is free to add on 
additional feature to the insurance package, but then only for its own members. The 
Muungano does not have individual members, rather each of the 7 groups is a member of 
this super-structure. It is the group rather than the member that is responsible for paying 
the premium. That means that monitoring and enforcement occurs within groups of 8-20 
people, but insurance is obtained from a pool of over 100 people. This is of course is very 
similar to the idea behind group-based lending made famous by the Grameen Bank. The 
main difference is that in Nyakatoke it grew completely from within the community 
without outside interventions aimed at creating these groups. 
                                                  
11 Groups that have no name are identified by the name of the chairperson.  
 
4. Inclusiveness and Impact 
 
These insurance groups are remarkable not only by their functioning but also on account 
of their widespread membership. This section looks at what determines membership, how 
much protection is offered and how important this insurance is for its members. In the 
sample of 15 Ethiopian villages (the ERHS), it was found that about 80 per cent of 
households were members of at least one iddir. However, after excluding two villages in 
the most Northern region of Tigray, where, apparently, these institutions are not yet 
present, membership is virtually comprehensive. They could be found in all the other 
villages included in the sample and, in almost all villages, more than 95 per cent of 
households were members of at least one group.12 In one village, Sirbana Godeti, where 
groups were matched with household data, it was found that households were members of 
up to eight groups and, on average, a member of between two and three groups. In 
Tanzania, with data on only one village, about 95 per cent of household were members of 
the village level Bujuni. Almost all households with a female adult took out additional 
insurance from one of the seven village women’s groups. Overall, households are 
members of about three groups. 
 
The widespread membership across the population suggests that these groups are quite 
inclusive. Even though the percentage of people not included is relatively small, it is still 
relevant to explore who may not be included in these schemes. The Ethiopian data13 was 
used to investigate whether membership was affected by socio-economic characteristics. 
It was found that the probability of membership increased with the age of the head and 
with household size. This is consistent with people typically only considering joining 
iddirs after they marry and start a family. There was no effect from current living 
standards.14 Mariam (2003) suggested that in his sample of 1200 households, mainly in 
rural Ethiopia, those not members were either newly arrived migrants, who were not yet 
well established in the area, or those not yet married but already cultivating their own 
land as an independent family member. In Tanzania, the few not included in any scheme 
were not significantly different from others. In both contexts, funeral groups were 
originally based on ethnicity, religion and kinship, but the large number of different 
groups available means that there everyone could in principle be a member of some 
group. For Ethiopia, Mariam (2003) added that all iddirs in his sample area now state that 
                                                  
12 Other surveys confirm the widespread membership. Open-ended questioning on which social 
organisations households are members of in a sample in South Wollo collected found about 80 per cent of 
households to be members of at least one iddir (Mogues, 2004; Mariam, 2003) reported in his survey of 
about 1 200 households in 40 largely rural communities in Ethiopia that 87 per cent of households were 
members of an iddir. 
13 This analysis uses the 4th round of the data (from 1997) which included specific questions on 
membership. Membership in that round of the data was about 75 per cent – below the estimate from other 
rounds – possibly due to slight underestimation related to less precise use of the local terms to describe the 
funeral societies, affecting data collection in two villages (one in Northern Shoa and one in Daramolo). The 
regressions used a probit model, using community level fixed effects. 
14 In particular, current consumption levels are not significant. Land holdings are also not significant, while 
there is a very small effect from livestock holdings, increasing the probability of being a member, but the 
marginal effect is very small and only significant at 11 per cent.  
anyone in the same locality, regardless of religion or socio-economic status could apply 
to be members. In Tanzania, qualitative interviews with members and non-members 
confirmed that once one is willing to adhere to the rules of the group and give timely 
contributions when the rules so demand, there is likely to be no objection to anyone 
joining a group. 
 
However, in both cases there is evidence that the extent of coverage is higher for richer 
households. In both contexts, households can be members of different groups. As a result, 
people can choose to have more insurance coverage by joining more groups, or by 
joining groups offering higher insurance linked to higher contributions. This is 
investigated further in both data sets. In the data on Nyakatoke, an investigation on the 
coverage taken out by households suggested that the mean funeral coverage was 
equivalent to about 21 per cent of total yearly household consumption (while health 
coverage offered was on average about 2 per cent). In Ethiopia, it was not possible to 
analyse coverage on the full data set, but there is data on total payments over a four-
month period in 1997 by households to iddirs, which will give a good indication of the 
coverage they could themselves receive. Table 5 reports the result of simple regression 
analysis, linking the funeral coverage (Tanzania) or total contributions (Ethiopia) to a set 
of characteristics. For the Tanzanian data, ordinary least squares were used; for Ethiopia, 
where about a fifth of households did not spend on iddirs, a tobit model was used. In 
Ethiopia, the regression controls for community fixed effects, so the focus is on within-
village differences. The characteristics used were household size, age of the household 
head, whether the  head had completed primary school, sex of the head and a set of 
(cumulative) dummies for wealth (based on the overall consumption levels). The 
Tanzanian data also allow for controls for the location within the village and for the 
shared genetic stock with other people in the village. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Funeral Coverage/contributions per Household 
  Tanzania 
Total funeral coverage per 
household 
(ordinary least squares) 
Ethiopia 
Total contributions per household 
(tobit model with community fixed 
effects) 
  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Household size  4601.6  0.026  1.452  0.000 
Age of household head  272.1  0.471  -0.046  0.193 
Primary school completed?  -1937.0  0.875  -2.794  0.113 
Sex of head  -1265.9  0.933  2.811  0.027 
Genetic share*1000  1065.2  0.087  -  - 
Distance to centre of village  6.5  0.863  -  - 
Richest 75 percent (dummy)  32741.2  0.040  2.568  0.092 
Richest 50 percent (dummy)  -17264.6  0.275  2.308  0.109 
Richest 25 percent (dummy)  7208.1  0.634  3.055  0.039 
Constant  62.1291  0.058  -24.602  0.000 
R-squared  0.135 (adjusted)  0.0654 (pseudo) 
Note: Genetic share is defined as the extent of blood relationship with other people in the village; richest 75 
percent is a dummy one if person belongs to the 75 percent highest levels of consumption per adult; 
richest 50 percent and 25 percent are similarly defined. Note that for the richest 75 percent, the three 
dummies will have the value one. The poorest group is excluded. Sample size for Ethiopia data is 
1260; for Tanzania 120. 
  
The regression suggests that larger households take out more coverage, which suggests 
that they respond to the incentives given in the scheme: larger households stand to benefit 
more from the system. In all groups, the policy covers all members of the household 
irrespective of total household size. However, there is no extra cost when insuring extra 
individuals within a household  — so it is relatively more advantageous for larger 
households to join. The other key effect is that the poorer households have significantly 
less insurance. In the Tanzanian data, the richest 75 per cent dummy is positive and 
significant, while no other wealth dummies are significant. The size of the wealth effect 
suggests that in Tanzania, the poorer have typically 25 per cent less coverage than the 
average household. Similarly, in Ethiopia, contributions systematically increase with 
wealth, and there is clear evidence of the richest 25 per cent insuring themselves 
significantly more than the rest.15 
 
A further issue is the composition of the groups: who joins what type of group? Is there 
any evidence of matching or selection in the group composition? Assortative matching is 
typically considered as a benefit in terms of being able to save on information and 
enforcement costs — it is often suggested that similar people will find it easier to monitor 
and enforce contracts (Hoff, 1997; Ghatak, 1999). Nevertheless, analysis of the group 
composition in the matched data of households and groups in both countries found only 
limited evidence of matching. For example, there is no evidence that richer people joined 
specifically particular groups. In De Weerdt (2004), this was found to be rather different 
when investigating pure “informal” linkages between households in the Tanzanian 
sample (where linkages were defined on the basis of household and individual level 
questions on “who would you turn to for help?” and “to whom would you give 
assistance?”). The evidence showed that wealth and geographical distance mattered 
significantly and strongly in determining these linkages. In other words, this suggests that 
these more formal organisations can afford to allow people from a more diverse 
background to become members, presumably since clear rules and regulations can 
compensate for some of the informational and enforcement advantages of social and 
geographical proximity. 
 
Finally, how important is funeral protection for the households involved? Funeral costs 
are very substantial  — although the full costs are hard to estimate, but definitely a 
significant proportion of a month’s income. In Ethiopia, the average cash payout per iddir 
is about 40 per cent of monthly household consumption (and the average household is 
usually a member of more than one group), so iddirs are crucial to allow households to 
cover these expenses. In fact, the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey data suggest that for 
                                                  
15 It is standard practice to have multiple memberships of groups as a means of increasing coverage. 
Alternatively, it could be asked why they are not choosing to increase contributions in the existing groups 
to get more coverage. When discussing this with the groups, it was argued that the only feasible group 
structure is one in which everybody contributes the same, so that coverage is identical among members. 
Furthermore, it was often hard to find consensus among all members to increase contributions once a group 
is established so that for a member to obtain higher coverage, the most feasible route would be to also join 
another group, unless enough people can be found willing to set up a new group with higher coverage, and 
leave the original group. Membership fees limit the incentives for this behaviour.  
the poorest wealth quartile, monthly payments to the iddir are about 40 per cent of total 
monthly health expenditures — and for the richest groups still about 30 per cent.16  
 
In Tanzania, payouts per group to the household are about 25 per cent of average monthly 
consumption, while households are typically a member of about three groups. In short, 
these sums are substantial, and given the large expenses required for socially acceptable 
funerals, the funeral insurance groups perform a crucial role in these communities. 
However, one should not forget that, apart from this substantial insurance, much risk 
remains uninsured resulting in substantial welfare fluctuations and losses — for example, 
see Dercon and Krishnan (2000) and Dercon and De Weerdt (2002). Dercon and De 
Weerdt (2002) found that health shocks were causing households to cut back on average 
about 20 per cent of non-food expenditure in the Tanzanian sample. In Ethiopia in 1994-




It may be tempting but wholly misleading to consider these insurance groups as age-old 
traditional institutions. There is no doubt that mechanisms of mutual support would have 
existed in traditional society, but this does not imply that the currently observed 
associations are just replicas of these mechanisms. In this section, a brief discussion of 
the origins of these institutions is presented — more details can be found i n Pankhurst 
(2003) and De Weerdt (2001). The main point in this section is to show that these 
institutions are best understood as organisational structures developed in interaction with 
the general socioeconomic and political context, and that they evolved in response to 
changes in this environment.17 Some of the existing literature on these institutions in 
Ethiopia appears to take issue with this view, not least with some of the detail involved 
(Aredo, 1993, 1998). For example, Aredo (1998) suggests that these institutions may 
even have existed in the 19th century — even though there is no clear evidence in written 
sources on this, and our own investigations in the same field setting as Aredo suggest that 
the basis for this claim is weak. In any case, much more work is needed to properly settle 
some of these issues.18 
 
In the debate about the origins of the iddir in Ethiopia, a number of interrelated issues 
have been debated. First, is it basically a rural institution transposed in an urban setting or 
is it an institution that emerged in the context of urbanisation and then spread to rural 
areas? The answer depends on what is meant by iddir. Societies across the world have 
                                                  
16 The fact that the poor spend relatively more on funeral expenses than health expenditures than the rich is 
also an indictment of the health service quality and access offered to the poor in Ethiopia. It suggests a 
lower income elasticity for funeral spending than for health spending, which implies that funerals are 
considered more of a necessity than health spending by households. When incomes fall, they will cut back 
more on health than on funerals: they consider it better to spend money on burying people than trying to 
cure them. 
17 This does not contradict that these institutions are responses to market failures. Effectively, they are non-
market institutions taking on functions that a perfectly working insurance market could perform. But the 
specific form these institutions take on is still conditioned by the local context. 
18 It was striking that no specific literature dealing with these institutions and their possible precursors in 
more traditional Haya society in Tanzania could be traced.  
cultural requirements for burial and some rules of conduct regarding the way co-
operation and mutual support is required for funerals. However, the specific way the iddir 
is organised suggests that it emerged in a context of monetisation and literacy, and 
probably closely linked to urbanisation — and the need to have clearer community links 
and obligations.19 The available data suggests that it is an early 20th century institution, 
probably started by migrants and it was initially linked to the Gurage, an ethnic group 
with a history of migration and trading.20 The number of iddirs increased significantly in 
the capital, Addis Ababa, during the Italian occupation (1936-40) and they started 
spreading from urban areas to rural areas thereafter.  
 
There is also little evidence that there has been any outside influence, for example from 
similar institutions across Africa. If anything, it is likely that they emerged in parallel 
with similar organisations across Africa and elsewhere. There is also evidence of a 
complex relationship with the state. Until the 1960s, iddirs had been relatively invisible 
institutions. This changed when, in the 1960s, municipal authorities in Addis Ababa and, 
more generally, the Ministry of National Community Development sought to promote 
collaboration between iddirs and the government. At the same time, some politicians used 
these associations as platforms for political purposes. In this period, different iddirs 
became involved in broader development activities. An attempted coup in 1966, partly 
blamed on an indigenous migrant association, meant that the state tried to establish more 
control over these associations, including iddirs. The revolution of 1974 brought the Derg 
to power, after which the leadership of the iddir were considered reactionary elites and 
most iddirs retreated to focus only on burial activities, and the formerly strong urban 
associations were marginalised. Nevertheless, the spread throughout rural Ethiopia 
clearly continued, while the size of some urban based iddirs increased considerably. 21 
 
In recent years, the EPRDF government (which came to power after the fall of the Derg 
in 1991) has increased its interest in working with associations like the iddir. The 
Ministry of Health has expressed an interest in working with iddirs most notably in anti- 
HIV/AIDS campaigns, while there have been suggestions to involve organisations such 
as the iddirs in spreading modern agricultural activities. The government has also been 
interested in organising iddirs within towns into broader associations. In the same period, 
certain NGOs, notably ACORD, have started to work with iddirs, although this remains 
largely a limited number of instances or activities. Some iddirs have themselves also 
started to try to expand their activities. For example, 21 iddirs in the west of Addis Ababa 
                                                  
19 Although this needs further analysis, it is striking that, in the villages covered by the ERHS, villages in 
less densely populated areas and with poorer infrastructure and market linkages, fewer iddirs were found. 
Furthermore, in one of the two Tigrayan villages where no iddir was found, villagers simply stated that this 
is something for town people and not needed in a (remote) village like theirs where everybody still 
interacted with everybody else. 
20 Pankhurst (2002) presents evidence that the first reported iddir was formed by a group of Soddo Gurage 
traders, and gained legitimacy via a government Minister of Emperor Menelik at the beginning of the 20th 
century. 
21 There are examples of large professional or work-based iddirs in urban areas. Note that the spread in 
urban areas is sufficiently large to imply that the vast majority of urban dwellers will be members of one or 
more iddirs, across social classes. Indeed, even the World Bank’s country office has its own iddir.  
have formed an umbrella association, strictly  politically neutral but focusing on 
developmental activities.  
 
The experience in Nyakotoke in Tanzania provides another interesting example of how 
these institutions evolve in response to changing political contexts. The village burial 
society, the Bujuni (meaning “mutual help” in Haya) is a relatively old indigenous 
institution. However, it only became more formalised after 1973, under the impulse of a 
migrant from another village, who had suggested making the rules and regulations more 
explicit. Some form of mutual cooperation existed similarly among women, but 
formalisation came much later. In 1973, as part of the radical changes instigated by 
President Nyerere’s ruling party, women were forced to “unite” in formal groups as part 
of the UWT (the Swahili acronym for the Union of Tanzanian Women), organised in 
relatively large “village” level groups interpreted to include many communities beyond 
Nyakatoke, with pressure to set up village shops and other collective institutions via 
(forced) contributions. The village shop became bankrupt five years later and 
increasingly the UWT groups became just political institutions. However, after this 
experience, some 70 women decided to set up a group involved in economic activities to 
raise money for events such as funerals, births and hospitalisation, independently of the 
UWT and surviving its gradual disappearance. The group did not survive long and from 
1984 factions broke away, and effectively these groups became the predecessors of the 
current groups, with a common element of providing insurance for funerals and 
hospitalisation. In 1994, the different women’s groups (under the impulse of a recent 
migrant) formed the Muungano, the union of the women’s group, integrating the basic 
minimum funeral and hospitalisation  insurance. Since then, the different groups have 
experienced a relative degree of stability via the Muungano. Overall, the groups clearly 
conform to the idea of an indigenous association, even thought they were initially 
inspired by the formalised activities of the UWT. There is no evidence of any outside 
involvement in any of the current groups or their predecessors, and linked to the bad 
experiences in the UWT, they have stayed clear of any political capture even at the local 
level, steering away from the activities of the ruling party or the emerging opposition. 
The rules and regulations have clearly evolved over time, moving gradually further away 
from economic activities towards a clear focus on specific insurance. 
 
6. The Challenge of HIV/AIDS 
 
HIV/AIDS has been ravaging the study area near Lake Victoria in Tanzania for more 
than a decade while, in Ethiopia, the epidemic is currently expanding at an alarming rate. 
This section discusses the limited evidence available on the impact of the AIDS crisis on 
membership based indigenous insurance associations, particularly those concerned with 
funeral expenditure insurance. 
 
A priori, HIV/AIDS has brought about a fundamental change in the risk environment 
faced by groups insuring funeral expenditures. These institutions had been developing in 
a context of gradually decreasing mortality figures in the decades up until the 1990s. The 
impact of HIV/AIDS has resulted not just in higher mortality, but has also brought about 
a fundamental change in the mortality risk distribution across the age and possibly even  
the wealth distribution. The result is that the likelihood of the association being asked to 
contribute to the funeral of a member has increased, putting pressure on the finances and 
sustainability of these institutions. During interviews in the rural sample of iddirs in 
Ethiopia used in this paper, iddir leaders suggested that HIV/AIDS had only had a limited 
impact on societies so far. This is likely to be correct: in rural Ethiopia, the epidemic is 
only now beginning to spread and mortality rates have only just begun to increase. 
Consequently, iddirs have not yet had to change their rules. In any case, in recent years 
mortality figures in most parts of rural Ethiopia are more likely to have been more 
affected by the deaths of conscripts of the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000 and the 
drought in 2001/02. However, many had sufficient information on HIV/AIDS to report 
that premiums would have to increase in the future. In the particular study village in rural 
Kagera in Tanzania, similarly only limited impact of HIV/AIDS on groups providing 
funeral insurance was reported although generally the groups surveyed were well aware 
of the actual and potential problems involved. They also could report anecdotal evidence 
on changes in funeral societies’ arrangements in some areas linked to HIV/AIDS, for 
example involving less expensive funerals. 
 
The clearest evidence available on the impact of the crisis comes from Pankhurst and 
Mariam (2004), based on a survey in urban Addis Ababa on the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
the iddirs. They found that of 120 respondent iddirs, 93 per cent reported experiencing an 
increase in the number of deaths among their members in the last three years. The 
number of households receiving burial support in the past had been about 20 per group on 
average, but this average has now increased to about 31. The observed increase in 
mortality was largely confined to the age group of 15 to 35 years, consistent with the 
demographic predictions on the impact of HIV/AIDS. The iddirs also reported increases 
in bankruptcy of other iddirs due to increased mortality, while about a third of iddirs had 
already started to respond to the crisis by increasing contributions or finding alternative 
ways of increasing income, such  as by renting out utensils. Another study (Tesfaye, 
2002) found similar consequences and responses due to the crisis. This is also bound to 
put pressure on the poorer members of iddirs. On the basis of the in-depth study of three 
iddirs in Addis Ababa, Shewamoltot (2001) found substantial increases in regular 
contributions and suggested that some members had already withdrawn from the iddir 
due to the increased financial cost. Other iddirs tried to contain the crisis by only paying 
out half the usual benefit at the time of the death and the other half conditional on the 
continuing payment of the membership fee by the surviving family members. Finally, a 
striking consequence of the HIV/AIDS crisis on the iddirs is that all these studies report 
that many iddirs have taken the lead in HIV/AIDS education of their members — about 
half the iddirs interviewed in 2002 by Pankhurst and Mariam (2004) now provided such 
information. 
 
This evidence clearly suggests that iddirs are likely to come under increasing pressure in 
the next few years making increased contributions inevitable. The result is likely to be a 
less inclusive institution, with the poor increasingly less able to contribute. The fact that 
iddirs are responding to the crisis in different ways is encouraging, and suggests that their 
survival in one form or another may well be possible. In any case, if their important 
function in the social fabric as a key social protection mechanism is to be maintained, it  





A membership based indigenous insurance scheme is a locally initiated association of 
people, who have voluntarily entered into an explicit agreement to help each other in a 
well-defined way when well defined events occur. We call these organisations indigenous 
because they have grown from within the community. We call them membership based, 
because the group is completely owned and managed by its beneficiaries. They were not 
established, nor were they developed by anyone but their own members. They are 
voluntary because no one is under strict pressure to become a member of a particular 
group. 
 
Historical analysis from some survey areas in Ethiopia and Tanzania has shown that these 
groups are not “traditional” — a term that would suggest that these institutions may have 
existed unchanged for centuries, whereas they are often relatively new creations and have 
certainly been evolving and changing. 
 
Analysis from a survey of these associations, matched with household data on the 
members and the population at large has shown that these groups manage to insure a 
sizeable part of the expenditures attached to at least some shocks. The associations seem 
to be inclusive, in the sense that anyone who is willing to abide by their rules is able to 
join and, at least in the areas under study, these groups showed a high prevalence. In most 
communities we counted several such associations and most households were member of 
more than one group. When different groups offer different products this leads to the 
emergence of a localised insurance market and introduces an element of choice for the 
households. Unfortunately, despite these attractive characteristics, people are still found 
to be severely affected by different manifestations of risk. 
 
Finally, we noted that Ethiopian funeral associations are likely to come under increasing 
pressure in the next few years if HIV/AIDS makes increased premiums necessary. The 
result is likely to be a less inclusive institution, with the poor increasingly less able to 
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